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BRYANT V. MEDIA RIGHT PRODUCTIONS, INC.
 In 2008, iTunes surpassed Walmart as the number one music retailer in the 
United States.1 iTunes, Apple’s online digital music store, offers a music catalogue of 
over thirteen million songs and has over fifty million customers.2 Along with other 
online music retailers such as Rhapsody, eMusic, and Amazon.com, iTunes offers 
consumers the choice to purchase various artists’ music online either by purchasing 
the entire music album or by purchasing individual songs. While the online 
availability of music has increased the number of consumers purchasing music, sales 
of individual songs often outnumber the sales of entire albums.3 For instance, in 
2008, recording artist Katy Perry sold 2.2 million copies of her hit single “I Kissed A 
Girl,” from her album titled One of the Boys, on iTunes; however, she sold only 
282,000 copies of the album as a whole.4 As one commentator has noted, “[t]hat sort 
of single-to-album sales ratio simply never happened pre-iTunes.”5
 As a result of the wide availability of music online and the popularity of the MP3 
player, music is now generally offered and marketed to consumers on a per-song basis. 
For instance, in 2009, Apple introduced iTunes’s three-tiered pricing system for 
individual songs.6 Under this pricing system, iTunes offers the majority of its songs to 
consumers at $0.99 per song, while the price of older songs was reduced to $0.69 per 
song and the cost of new hit songs or popular songs was raised to $1.29 per song. By 
implementing this three-tiered pricing system, “Apple and major music labels [were] 
betting that . . . the iTunes Music Store [would] boost music sales with a new mix of 
song-based packages and give consumers more options.”7 In the world of copyright law, 
however, the song-based marketing of music creates some problems. When an album is 
registered with the U.S. Copyright Office, it is for many purposes considered one 
“work” under the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Copyright Act”).8 For instance, the 
Copyright Act provides that the infringement of one album, in its entirety, constitutes 
infringement of one “work.” But what if someone breaks an album apart into its 
1. See Press Release, Apple, iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the U.S. (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://
www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03iTunes-Store-Top-Music-Retailer-in-the-US.html. iTunes 
became the largest music retailer in the United States based on the amount of music sold during January 
and February 2008. Id.
2. See id. See generally What Is iTunes?, iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes/what-is/ (last visited Jan. 27, 
2012).
3. See Ethan Smith & Nick Wingfield, More Artists Steer Clear of iTunes, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 2008, at 
B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121987440206377643.html.
4. See Bryan Boyd, iTunes Under Threat as Bands Take Their Business Elsewhere, The Telegraph (Sept. 25, 
2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/3561194/iTunes-under-threat-as-bands-
take-their-business-elsewhere.html.
5. Id.
6. See Yinka Adegoke, iTune Tiered Pricing Goes Live, WIRED (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.wired.com/
techbiz/media/news/2009/04/reuters_us_apple_itunes?currentPage=1.
7. Id. (emphasis added).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
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constituent parts and distributes one, or three, or ten songs to consumers individually? 
Is this an infringement of one, three, or ten “works”? The unbundling of the album in 
today’s music industry begs an important legal question: Which is the “work”—the 
song or the album?
 In Bryant v. Media Right Productions, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that a music album, instead of each song on the album, 
constitutes one “work” for the purposes of calculating statutory damages under 
section 504(c) of the Copyright Act.9 This case comment contends that the Second 
Circuit erred in its analysis and overlooked the opportunity to adopt the independent 
economic value test and apply it to music. First, in applying Second Circuit precedent, 
the court focused its analysis on the artists’ choice to distribute their music in album 
form, rather than focusing on the defendants’ discrete acts of infringement of each 
individual song. Second, its narrow interpretation of section 504(c) of the Copyright 
Act frustrates the purpose of the statute where, as here, an album has been unbundled 
and its individual songs redistributed. Finally, the court overlooked the opportunity 
presented by Bryant to adopt the independent economic value test, which at least 
four other circuits follow.10 Had the court in Bryant adopted this test, it would have 
reached a decision that would better serve two of the main goals of the Copyright 
Act: to promote the progress and development of the arts and to protect those arts by 
deterring future infringers.11 The Second Circuit’s holding in Bryant, in effect, 
precludes any copyright owner from obtaining statutory damages for the infringement 
of individual songs that are part of an album, unless those songs were also separately 
released, by the copyright owner, as singles. Adopting the independent economic 
value test, and applying it to music, would better promote the purpose of the 
Copyright Act while also keeping the Act in line with the new developments and 
technology that now dominate today’s music industry.
9. 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2010), aff ’g Bryant v. Europadisk, Ltd., No. 07 Civ 3050(WGY), 2009 WL 
1059777 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2009).
10. See Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997); 
MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766 (11th Cir. 1996); Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-
Chea, 11 F.3d 1106 (1st Cir. 1993); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
11. See U.S. Const. art I, § 8 (granting Congress the authority to enact laws “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries”); 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) (granting copyright owners 
damages for the purpose of deterring future infringers when a copyright owner’s ‘exclusive right’ is 
infringed); see also Sarah A. Zawada, “Infringed” Versus “Infringing”: Different Interpretations of the Word 
“Work” and the Effect on the Deterrence Goal of Copyright Law, 10 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 129, 148 
(2006) (stating that “the deterrence of prospective infringers” is one of the main goals of copyright law 
(citing Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, L.L.C., No. Civ. A 03-4962, 2005 WL 67077, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2005))). “Statutory damages serve the dual purpose of compensation and deterrence: 
they compensate the plaintiff for the infringement of its copyright, and they deter future infringements 
by punishing the defendant for its actions.” Schiffer Publ ’g, 2005 WL 67077, at *4.
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 Anne Bryant12 and Ellen Bernfeld,13 the appellants in the Second Circuit decision, 
are accomplished songwriters and owners of the record label Gloryvision, Ltd.14 In the 
late 1990s they produced two albums, entitled Songs for Dogs and Songs for Cats, each 
containing ten songs.15 Appellants registered each album, as well as the individual 
songs from the albums, with the U.S. Copyright Office.16 All of the songs were 
composed, arranged, performed, and recorded by the appellants and their record label, 
Gloryvision, Ltd.17 Appellants sold their albums in stores, by direct mail order, and 
through Amazon.com.18 The albums were sold as physical copies only, and each album 
was gift packaged and accompanied by a fully illustrated, colorful book.19 The 
appellants asserted that it was never their intention to make either the albums or the 
individual songs available to consumers in any electronic or digital form.20
 On February 24, 2000, appellants entered into a marketing agreement with 
Media Right Productions, Inc.21 (“Media Right”) to increase distribution of their 
12. Anne Bryant is a co-owner of Gloryvision, Ltd. See Anne Bryant, IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/
find?q=anne+bryant&s=all (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). She is a music and video producer and the composer/
arranger of numerous enduring themes and songs including the Jem show theme and song score and the 
Transformers theme. Id. Anne also develops software and creates and edits music videos. Id.
13. Ellen Bernfeld (also known as Norma Human) is a co-owner of Gloryvision, Ltd. See Ellen Bernfeld, 
IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0076739/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). She is a singer, songwriter, 
performance artist-producer, and the singing voice of “Pizzazz” from the Jem show and Menage, the 80’s 
Disco Queen. Id.
14. See Bryant, 603 F.3d at 138.
15. See Bryant v. Europadisk, Ltd., No. 07 Civ 3050 (WGY), 2009 WL 1059777, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 
2004), aff ’d sub nom. Bryant, 603 F. 3d 135. Titles from Songs for Dogs include: “The No Song,” “If I Only 
Had a Thumb,” “I Stole the Christmas Pie,” “Please Don’t Forget My Birthday,” “The Very First Dog,” “Do 
the Doggie Salsa,” “I Been Cryin’ All Night Since You’re Gone,” “Follow the Bone Lady,” “Tomorrow’s 
Another Day,” and “Could You Be An Angel.” Song titles from Songs for Cats include: “I’m Sweetie the 
Gourmet,” “Curious x9,” “Oh, My Little Sushi,” “The Scat Cat,” “Watchin’ Purry Mason,” “I Pray For the 
World (A Christmas Prayer),” “Allergic To You,” “Catrina, the Ballerina,” “Where Will I Sleep Tonight,” 
and “I’m Purrfeet.” Complaint at 4–5, Europadisk, 2009 WL 1059777. 
16. See Europadisk, 2009 WL 1059777, at *2. There has been some discrepancy as to how many of appellants’ 
songs were actually registered individually. In Bryant, the Second Circuit decided the case on the assumption 
that the appellants registered each album, as well as each of the individual twenty songs from the albums, 
with the U.S. Copyright Office. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3 n.1, Bryant v. Media Right Prods., 
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 656 (2010) (No. 10-415), 2010 WL 3740540. Appellants’ petitition to the Supreme Court 
states that the appellate record contains only eight copyright registrations out of the twenty songs on the 
albums. Id. However, Petitioners’ counsel represented that fourteen of the songs were individually 
copyrighted due to the fact that the copyright registrations for the albums themselves indicate that ten of the 
songs on Songs for Cats and four of the songs from Songs for Dogs had individual copyrights. Id. 
17. See Europadisk, 2009 WL 1059777, at *2. 
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. “Gloryvision sold the albums in retail stores, by direct mail order, and through Amazon.com (in 
tangible form, not as digital downloads).” Id.
21. Media Right is a successful music production company that deals with music in film, television, and 
advertising and works with clients such as Playboy Enterprises, The National Football League, and the 
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work.22 This agreement did not convey any intellectual property rights to Media 
Right, nor did it convey any authority to Media Right to manufacture or make either 
physical or digital copies of appellants’ work.23 The appellants supplied Media Right 
with all music Media Right was to distribute, in the form of physical copies, either 
on cassette tape or compact disc.24
 Twenty-three days before the agreement between appellants and Media Right 
went into effect, Media Right signed another agreement with Orchard Enterprises, 
Inc. (the “Orchard Agreement”). Orchard Enterprises, Inc. (“Orchard”) is a 
distributor of physical and digital media, which it sells online. 25 Orchard also 
supplies third-party music vendors, such as iTunes, eMusic, Rhapsody, and MSN, 
with digital media for resale online.26 According to the Orchard Agreement, Media 
Right authorized Orchard to distribute eleven CD titles mostly comprised of works 
created by Media Right. Notably, the Orchard Agreement also included the two 
albums produced by the appellants, Songs for Dogs and Songs for Cats.27 Thus, without 
the approval of appellants, Media Right entered into the Orchard Agreement and 
granted Orchard the “non-exclusive rights to sell, distribute and otherwise exploit 
any and all of [Media Right’s] [r]ecordings by any and all means and media . . . 
including . . . but not limited to, those via the Internet, as well as all digital storage, 
download and transmission rights.”28
 In 2006, appellants became aware that Amazon.com had Songs for Dogs and 
Songs for Cats available for purchase on its website. However, Media Right and 
Orchard were listed as the artist and the record label instead of Anne Bryant and 
Ellen Bernfeld.29 No credit was given to Bryant, Bernfeld, or Gloryvision, Ltd. Upon 
further investigation, appellants found that both albums, as well as the individual 
songs from each album, were available to consumers for purchase on several online 
music sites, including iTunes and Rhapsody.30 Rhapsody even offered consumers free 
New York Mets. See About, Media Right Productions, http://www.mediarightproductions.com/
about.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
22. See Europadisk, 2009 WL 1059777, at *2.
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. Orchard Enterprises, Inc. is a multi-million dollar marketing and distribution company specializing in 
music and video entertainment. Orchard is headquartered in New York and London with twenty-five 
offices worldwide. See About, The Orchard, http://www.theorchard.com/about (last visited Jan. 27, 
2012).
26. See Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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streaming access to some of the songs as part of an introductory offer to join.31 Again, 
appellants were not credited.32
 In April 2007, appellants filed suit against Media Right and Orchard in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging direct and contributory 
copyright infringement33 and requesting statutory damages.34 The district court held 
that both Media Right and Orchard had committed direct copyright infringement 
by selling unauthorized digital copies of appellants’ albums and individual songs.35 
According to the district court, however, each album, rather than each song, 
constituted one “work” under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act.36
 In October 2009, appellants appealed the decision of the district court to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that, among 
other things, the district court erred in refusing to grant a separate statutory damage 
award for each song infringed on both of the albums.37 Relying on decisions from the 
D.C., First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the appellants argued that the district 
court should have determined statutory damages by applying the independent 
economic value test.38
 The independent economic value test provides “that a work that is part of a 
multi-part product can constitute a separate work for the purposes of [calculating] 
31. Id.
32. Id. at *2. 
33. Id. at *1.
34. Id. at *6.
35. Id. at *4–6.
36. Id. at *7; see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). Subsection (c)(1) allows for statutory damages to be not less 
than $750 or more than $30,000, as the court considers just, per each infringed work. 17 U.S.C. § 
504(c)(1). Subsection (c)(2) states that if the court finds “that infringment was committed willfully,” the 
court may increase statutory damages up to $150,000 per infringement. If, however, the infringer “was 
not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of the copyright,” 
the court may reduce the statutory damges to as little as $200 per infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
In Europadisk, the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the infringement was willful while Media 
Right and Orchard had the burden of proving that their infringement was innocent. The district court 
found that Orchard’s infringement was innocent in nature because they proved they were unaware that 
Media Right did not have full rights to appellants’ music. See Europadisk, 2009 WL 1059777, at *7. 
Therefore, the district court reduced Orchard’s statutory damages from $750 to $200 for the 
infringement of each album, for a total of $400. Id. at *9. Although Media Right was unable to prove 
that its infringement was innocent, appellants were unable to prove that Media Rights’ infringement 
was willful. Id. Accordingly, the court required that Media Right pay $1,000 for the infringement of 
each album for a total of $2,000. Id. at *9–10. As far as profits from the infringment of appellants’ 
music, Orchard made a total of $578.91 in profits from both physical and digital sales of the albums and 
the individual songs. Of that amount, $413.82 was to go to Media Right and they were to turn over 
$331.06 to appellants, pursuant to the terms of their agreement. Id. at *4.
37. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010). Appellants also argued that the 
district court erred in its findings regarding the intent of both Media Right and Orchard as well as in 
determining the amount of statutory damages. See id. 
38. Id. at 141–42.
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statutory damages if it has ‘independent economic value and . . . is viable.’”39 
Furthermore, due to the Copyright Act’s requirement that “works” must be registered 
prior to the act of infringement to qualify for statutory damages,40 courts have held 
that individual works that are not separately registered, regardless of their independent 
economic value, will not be eligible for separate awards of statutory damages.41 Thus, 
according to the independent economic value test, a separately registered work that is 
part of a multi-part work can be subject to separate statutory damages if it has its 
own economic value and can stand on its own. Appellants argued that Media Right 
and Orchard should be liable for damages on a per-song basis because the two 
companies, without authorization, split appellants’ two albums apart into each 
album’s individual and copyrighted parts (i.e., the songs).42 Appellants argue that the 
individual songs on the albums were registered, written, composed, and arranged 
separately and, therefore, each constituted one “work” because each had independent 
economic value, highlighted by the fact that Media Right and Orchard sold the 
songs individually on iTunes.43
 In April 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The circuit 
court found appellants’ argument to be unpersuasive, stating that
39. Id. at 141. (second alteration in original) (quoting Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 
1106, 1116–17 (1st Cir. 1993)).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006).
Registration as prerequisite to certain remedies for infringement. In any action under 
this title, other than an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author under 
section 106A(a), an action for infringement of the copyright of a work that has been 
preregistered under section 408(f) before the commencement of the infringement and 
that has an effective date of registration not later than the earlier of 3 months after the 
first publication of the work or 1 month after the copyright owner has learned of the 
infringement, or an action instituted under section 411(c), no award of statutory 
damages or of attorney’s fees, as provided by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for—
(1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the 
effective date of its registration; or 
(2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and 
before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within three 
months after the first publication of the work.
 Id.
41. For instance, in Phillips v. Kidsoft, L.L.C., No. CCB-96-3827, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16564 (D. Md. 
Feb. 17, 1999), the U.S. District Court of Maryland found that thirty individual mazes, published by 
plaintiff in five books, did not qualify for individual awards of statutory damages because they were not 
separately copyrighted. See id. at *16. The district court in Phillips stated that “[i]n order to qualify as a 
separate ‘work’ under section 504(c)(1) . . . each maze at a minimum would have to be separately 
copyrighted and have an ‘independent economic value.’” Id. at *15. Similarly, in Mason v. Montgomery 
Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit held that 232 maps created and sold by plaintiff, 
individually and as sets, were not eligible for separate awards under § 504(c)(1) because they were not 
individually copyrighted and, therefore, could not have “independent economic value.” See id. at 144.
42. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 656 (2010) (No. 
10-415), 2010 WL 3740540.
43. See id.
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[the] Court has never adopted the independent economic value test, and we 
decline to do so in this case. The [Copyright] Act specifically states that all 
parts of a compilation must be treated as one work for the purpose of 
calculating statutory damages. This language provides no exception for a part 
of a compilation that has independent economic value, and the Court will not 
create such an exception.44
In narrowly interpreting on the text of the Copyright Act, the district court found 
that appellants’ albums were considered “compilations” under the Copyright Act 
and, therefore, each album constituted one “work” for the purposes of calculating 
statutory damages.45 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and 
awarded statutory damages for each album infringed.46
 This case comment contends that the Second Circuit in Bryant erred in 
calculating statutory damages on a per-album basis. First, the court relied on 
reasoning from prior decisions of the Second Circuit, and from its district courts, 
that focused on plaintiffs’ choice to distribute the music in album form instead of 
correctly focusing on the discrete infringement of each individual song in Bryant. 
Second, the circuit court’s analysis of section 504(c) of the Copyright Act is inapposite 
when applied to the facts in Bryant because the circuit court, again, failed to recognize 
Media Right’s and Orchard’s discrete infringement of each individual song when the 
defendants unbundled the appellants’ two albums into their constituent parts and 
sold them on a per-song basis without authorization. By narrowly construing the text 
of the Copyright Act, the court’s decision in Bryant frustrates the purpose of the 
Act, which is to promote the progress and development of the arts by deterring 
future infringers. Finally, the court’s decision in Bryant ignores a trend of cases in 
the D.C., First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits employing the independent economic 
value test. These circuits have applied the test to works that are part of a multi-part 
product and can stand on their own because the works are separately registered and 
have independent economic value. Had the Second Circuit applied the independent 
economic value test in Bryant it would have better accounted for the changes in 
media technology and the online music industry’s focus on single song sales, and 
therefore would have more effectively promoted the purpose of the Copyright Act.
 When a registered copyright47 is infringed, the copyright owner may choose to 
recover statutory damages, instead of actual damages, under section 504(c) of the 
Copyright Act.48 Courts have enjoyed wide discretion in calculating and awarding 
44. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 142 (footnote omitted).
45. See id. at 140–42.
46. Id. at 138. The Second Circuit also held that the district court did not commit clear error in finding that 
appellants had failed to prove willfulness and that Orchard had proven its innocence and that damages 
were correctly calculated. See id. 
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006) (requiring copyright registration as a prerequisite for the remedy of statutory 
damages in infringement actions).
48. See id. § 504(c); see also Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Report of the Register 
of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 102–03 (Comm. Print 
1961), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015008914338.
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statutory damages.49 Pursuant to the Copyright Act, a court may award statutory 
damages of no less than $750 or no more than $30,000, “as the court considers just” 
for “all infringements” of each “work” infringed and involved in the litigation.50
 The Copyright Act fails, however, to define the term “work,” which has led to 
different interpretations of what constitutes a “work” under the Act.51 Some courts 
have stated that a “work” is an expression that is “viable”52 or, in other words, can “live 
The need for this special remedy arises from the acknowledged inadequacy of actual 
damages and profits in many cases:
by an infringement is equally hard to determine. As a result, actual damages are 
often conjectural, and may be impossible and prohibitively expensive to prove.
that could be proven is the amount of a license fee. An award of such an amount 
would be an invitation to infringe with no risk of loss to the infringer.
owner of detecting and investigating infringements.
have been little or no profit, or it may be impossible to compute the amount of 
profits attributable to the infringement. Frequently, the infringer’s profits will not 
be an adequare measure of the injury caused to the copyright owner.
 Id.
49. See Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1116 (2d Cir. 1986).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
51. As one commentator has stated,
generally speaking the work is almost always taken as a given, at least in the liability 
phase. The one area of law where the absence of a statutory definition of a ‘work’ has 
challenged courts is in damage calculations, because [§ 504(c) of the Copyright Act] 
affords statutory damages based on the infringement of each work. 
 Justin Hughes, Size Matters (Or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 575, 622 (2005); see also 
Paul Goldstein, What Is a Copyrighted Work? Why Does It Matter?, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1175, 1175–76 
(2011) (“To begin, it strikes me as curious that a law, copyright, whose constitutional source puts its 
emphasis on ‘Writings,’ not ‘Authors,’ and whose governing statute extends its protection to ‘original 
works of authorship,’ nowhere in fact delimits the metes and bounds of a copyrighted work, or even 
prescribes a methodology for locating a work’s boundaries. Copyright law’s well-known idea-expression 
distinction may be highly indeterminate, but the statute at least provides markers to aid in the rule’s 
application. By contrast, the statute offers no guide to the boundaries of a copyrighted work, and, 
indeed, in one important place [§ 504(c)(1)], the statute expressly directs courts to ignore every legal 
commonsensical understanding of what a copyrighted work might be.” (footnotes omitted)).
52. See MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766, 769 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The circuits that have defined 
‘work’ have held that ‘separate copyrights are not distinct works unless they can live their own copyright 
life.’ This test focuses on whether each expression has an independent economic value and is, in itself, 
viable.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 
565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[I]n order to qualify for a separate minimum award, the work which is the 
subject of a separate copyright would have to be in itself . . . viable” (alteration in original) (quoting 3 
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14-04[E] at 14-40.13 (1989)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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[its] own copyright life”53 and has its own independent economic value.54 Some 
commentators have stated that copyright registration alone indicates that an expression 
qualifies as a “work” under the Copyright Act.55
 Section 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act states that “[f]or the purposes of this 
subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work.”56 
While the Copyright Act does not provide a definition for the word “work,” the 
word “compilation” is given an expansive definition in the Act and “is a work formed 
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes 
an original work of authorship.”57 The definition of “compilation” also includes 
“collective works,” which is defined as “a work . . . in which a number of contributions, 
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a 
collective whole.”58 To further illustrate what constitutes a “collective work,” the Act 
lists examples “such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia.”59 Relying on 
the text of the Copyright Act, the Second Circuit in Bryant concluded that appellants’ 
albums fell under the Copyright Act’s definition of compilation and, therefore, each 
album, not each song, was considered one “work” for the purposes of calculating 
statutory damages. Instead, Bryant should have applied the independent economic 
value test. The application of the test to the facts of this case would have created a 
rule that was in line with the current state of the music industry while also deterring 
future infringers.
 First, the Bryant court, instead of focusing on the discrete infringement of 
appellants’ individual “works” (i.e., the songs), improperly emphasized the form in 
which appellants chose to release their songs. In holding that statutory damages 
should be calculated on a per-album basis, the court stated that because appellants 
53. Robert Stigwood Grp. Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining that separate 
copyrights are not distinct works unless they can “live their own copyright life”).
54. See Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that the test to 
determine whether statutory damages should apply to individual works focuses “on whether each 
expression has an independent economic value”); Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 565 (explaining that 
while Mickey and Minnie are distinct, viable works, six different poses of the two characters only 
consituted two separate “works” under § 504(c)(1) because the different poses lacked “separate economic 
value”); Phillips v. Kidsoft, Inc., No. CCB-96-3827, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16564, at *15 (D. Md. Feb. 
17, 1999) (“In order to qualify as a separate ‘work’ under section 504(c)(1) . . . each [work] at a minimum 
would have to be separately copyrighted and have an ‘independent economic value.’”).
55. See Goldstein, supra note 51, at 1176–78 (explaining that the “ref lexive answer to the question, what 
constitutes a copyrighted work, is that the work is whatever the author says it is,” and, therefore, 
“registration offers a first—and usually final—approximation of the author’s intentions” as to what 
qualifies as a “work”); see also Hughes, supra note 51, at 634 (“[R]eference to copyright registration may 
be particularly appealing when the registration occurred well before litigation. In such circumstances, 
among alternative conceptions of the work, we can choose the conception the copyright owner chose.”).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).
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released the individual songs on Songs for Dogs and Songs for Cats in album form—a 
music album falls under the Act’s definition of “compilation”—the Copyright Act 
mandates that damages must be calculated on a per-album basis.60 However, the 
court fails to acknowledge Media Right’s and Orchard’s unbundling of the albums 
into their individual component songs and discrete infringement of appellants’ work. 
To support its holding, the court in Bryant examined prior decisions within the 
Second Circuit. The holdings in these cases, however, were not dependent upon 
whether plaintiffs released their copyrighted works “separately, or together as a unit,” 
as the Bryant court suggests.61 Rather, these cases were dependent upon the discrete 
infringement by the defendants who, in both instances, took plaintiffs’ individual 
works and created unauthorized compilations of their own.
 In Bryant, the Second Circuit focused on the fact that it was, after all, appellants’ 
choice to release the songs on Songs for Dogs and Songs for Cats in album form, rather 
than individually.62 The court found that a copyright owner’s choice to issue “its 
works separately or together as a unit” is dispositive as to whether the individual 
works or the unit will constitute the infringed “work” and, therefore, qualify for 
separate awards of statutory damages.63 The court relied on two previous Second 
Circuit decisions, Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd.64 and 
WB Music Corp. v. RTV Communications Group, Inc.,65 stating that “[i]n both 
decisions, we focused on whether the plaintiff—the copyright holder—issued its 
works separately, or together as a unit.”66 However, this reading is misleading because 
it attempts to define a copyrighted “work” by looking at what the author issues to the 
public, instead of what the author originally intended the “work” to be.
 In Twin Peaks, the defendant published a book, entitled Welcome to Twin Peaks: A 
Complete Guide to Who’s Who and What’s What, based on the first eight episodes of 
Twin Peaks.67 Twin Peaks was a television series that carried out one basic plot (Who 
killed Laura Palmer?) throughout its entire first season.68 The defendant conceded 
that each of the eight episodes was individually registered with the U.S. Copyright 
Office but argued that together they constituted one work for the purposes of section 
504(c) of the Copyright Act.69 The defendant’s argument was that each episode 
qualified as one constituent part of a larger “work”: the entire Twin Peaks series. The 
60. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010).
61. Id. at 141.
62. See id. (“[I]t is the copyright holders who issued their works as ‘compilations’; they chose to issue 
Albums.”).
63. Id. 
64. 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
65. 445 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2006).
66. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141.
67. Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1370.
68. Id. at 1381.
69. Id.
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Second Circuit disagreed stating, “The author of eight scripts for eight television 
episodes is not limited to one award of statutory damages just because he or she can 
continue the plot line from one episode to the next and hold the viewers’ interest.”70 
The Second Circuit in Twin Peaks affirmed the district court’s award of damages for 
each of the eight episodes infringed.
 Similarly, in WB Music, WB Music Corp. owned the copyrights to thirteen 
individual musical compositions.71 Defendant, RTV Communications Group, Inc. 
(“RTV”), created and distributed copies of seven CDs containing the thirteen 
musical compositions owned by WB Music.72 Based on the assumption that each of 
the seven CDs distributed by RTV constituted a “compilation” under section 504(c) 
of the Copyright Act, the district court granted seven awards of statutory damages.73 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to award WB Music 
statutory damages on a per-album basis and instead granted thirteen awards of 
statutory damages, one for each of WB Music’s infringed musical compositions.74 
The circuit court stated:
As in Twin Peaks, there is no evidence here that any of the separately 
copyrighted works were included in a compilation authorized by the copyright 
owners. Rather, the compilations were created by the defendants. . . . Each of 
the plaintiffs’ separate copyrighted works constitutes one work for purposes of 
§ 504(c)(1), and accordingly the defendants’ infringement of thirteen 
copyrights by copying thirteen songs onto seven distinct CD products 
warrants thirteen statutory damage awards.75
 The Second Circuit’s decision in Bryant erroneously relied on Twin Peaks and 
WB Music in mandating that statutory damages should be calculated on a per-album 
basis. Neither decision heavily relied on how each party chose to distribute their 
works. Instead in both Twin Peaks and WB Music, the Second Circuit’s decisions to 
award damages on a per-episode or per-composition basis, were dependent upon 
what exactly was infringed. In Twin Peaks, the infringement was of eight individual 
scripts. In WB Music, the infringement was of thirteen individual musical compositions. 
Likewise, in Bryant, the infringement was of twenty individual songs. There is little 
discussion, in either Twin Peaks or WB Music, regarding those plaintiffs’ decisions to 
distribute their work. Instead, the discussion focused on the infringers’ choices to 
create compilations, the book in Twin Peaks and the album in WB Music, by 
combining the plaintiffs’ individual works into unauthorized compilations. 
Furthermore, in Twin Peaks, the court dismissed the defendant’s contention that, 
because the episodes were part of a single television series, the individual episodes 
70. Id. 
71. 445 F.3d 538, 539 (2d Cir. 2006).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 540.
74. Id. at 541.
75. Id.
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should be considered one “work” for the purposes of calculating statutory damages.76 
In fact, it is the court’s dismissal of this argument in Twin Peaks that has served as a 
starting point for courts that have adopted the independent economic value test.77
 The Second Circuit in Bryant also cited three district court cases involving the 
infringement of music albums, stating that “[t]he few district courts that have 
considered whether a compilation is subject to only one statutory damage award have 
reached the same conclusion,” that statutory damages should be calculated on a per-
album basis.78 Yet, unlike in Bryant, the cited district court cases did not involve 
infringements of individual songs; the cases involved, instead, the infringement of 
entire albums only. For instance, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,79 
defendants copied tens of thousands of CDs, in which UMG Recordings owned 
copyrights, onto its servers to allow subscribers to listen to the CDs through their 
“My.MP3.com” service.80 In order to listen to any of the recordings, a subscriber had 
to “either ‘prove’ that he already owns the CD version of the recording by inserting 
his copy of the commercial CD into his computer . . . or . . . purchase the [entire] CD 
from one of defendant’s cooperating online retailers.”81
 These facts are distinguishable from the facts in Bryant, where the infringers 
unbundled the albums and redistributed the songs individually. In fact, the plaintiffs 
in UMG did not allege infringement of their individual songs—only of the albums—
until it was time for the district court to award statutory damages.82 In determining 
that plaintiffs would be awarded damages on a per-album basis, the district court in 
UMG emphasized “plaintiffs’ own assertion that what the defendant actually copied 
were the complete CDs.”83 Thus UMG is inapposite to the facts of Bryant.
76. Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993).
77. See, e.g., Gamma Audio & Video, Inc., v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993). In determining 
that separate episodes of a television series constitute individual “works” for the purposes of statutory 
damages, the First Circuit began its discussion by stating, “Our discussion is guided by the Second 
Circuit’s recent decision in Twin Peaks . . . . The Second Circuit found that Twin Peaks was an easy case, 
and that the eight teleplays or televised episodes clearly constituted eight separate works.” Id. 
78. See Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. 03-2670, 2006 WL 842883 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) 
(holding that statutory damages for counterfeit tape cassettes and CDs sold at a New Jersey f lea market 
would be calculated on a per-album basis); Country Road Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 
325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that where a music album is infringed, and plaintiffs do not allege 
infringement of individual songs, statutory damages should be awarded on a per-album basis); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. (UMG II), 109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that where 
a music album is infringed, and plaintiffs do not allege infringement of individual songs, statutory 
damages should be awarded on a per-album basis).
79. See UMG II, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 223 (denying plaintiff ’s motion to have statutory damages calculated on 
a per-song basis); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. (UMG I), 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (granting partial summary judgment motion in favor of plaintiffs for defendants’ infringement of 
CDs).
80. UMG I, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
81. Id.
82. UMG II, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
83. Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
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 The district court in UMG did not see the “appropriateness” of applying the 
independent economic value test to music, stating that to do so would “make a total 
mockery of Congress’ express mandate that all parts of a compilation must be treated 
as a single ‘work’ for purposes of computing statutory damages.”84 In a case like 
UMG, where the infringement was of the entire compilation only, the independent 
economic value test may not have been appropriate. Notably, the district court’s 
determination in UMG of the “appropriateness” of using the independent economic 
value test in music cases was made a full ten years before the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Bryant and a year before Apple released iTunes.85 The landscape of the music 
distribution industry had yet to transform into one dominated by online retailers and 
individual song sales.
 Additionally, the court in Bryant cited two cases involving the infringement of 
photographs and clip art.86 In Stokes Seeds Ltd. v. Geo. W. Park Seed Co.,87 a Western 
District of New York case, Stokes Seeds Limited (“Stokes”) commenced an action 
requesting a declaratory judgment as to whether their drawings infringed a copyright 
registration owned by Geo. W. Park Seed Co., Inc. (“Park”). Stokes was found to 
have infringed the individual photographs printed in two books published by Park 
when they sold seed packets with line drawings copied or derived from Park’s 
photographs.88 While Park had copyright registrations for each book, separate 
copyright registrations were not obtained for the individual photographs published 
therein.89 The district court held that Park’s books were compilations as defined by 
the Copyright Act and, therefore, Park would be granted only one award of statutory 
damages—for the book—instead of one award for each individual photograph 
infringed.90 In Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc.,91 a Fourth Circuit case, the appellees 
infringed individual clip art images from two CD-ROM products distributed by the 
appellants.92 While each CD-ROM was registered with the U.S. Copyright Office, 
each individual piece of clip art stored on either CD-ROM was not.93 The Fourth 
84. Id.
85. See Press Release, Apple, Apple Introduces iTunes—World’s Best and Easiest to Use Jukebox Software 
( Jan. 9, 2001), available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2001/01/09Apple-introduces-itunes-
worlds-best-and-easiest-to-use-jukebox-software.html.
86. See Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 141 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Xoom, Inc. v. 
Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2003); Stokes Seeds Ltd. v. Geo. W. Park Seed Co., 783 F. 
Supp. 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)).
87. 783 F. Supp. 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
88. See id. at 106. 
89. Id.
90. See id. at 107–08 (“Accordingly, Park has but one protected property—the book—and thus is not 
entitled to 122 separate damage awards corresponding to the individual photographs Stokes copied 
from the book.”).
91. 323 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2003).
92. See id. at 282.
93. See id. at 281. 
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Circuit held that, under the Copyright Act, CD-ROMs qualified as “compilations.” 
Therefore, as in Stokes, the Fourth Circuit in Xoom held that appellants would be 
granted only two awards of statutory damages—one for each CD-ROM—instead of 
one award of statutory damages for each clip art image infringed.94
 While both of these cases are similar to Bryant in that there was discrete 
infringement of a multi-part product, the Second Circuit in Bryant failed to make an 
important distinction: unlike the songs in Bryant, the individual works in both Stokes 
and Xoom, i.e., the photographs in Stokes, and the clip art images in Xoom, were not 
separately registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. In order for a copyrighted work 
to qualify for statutory damages, regardless of whether one is relying on the 
independent economic value test or not, the work must be registered with the U.S. 
Copyright Office.95 The Second Circuit’s second error was its narrow interpretation 
of the text and legislative history of the Copyright Act in a way that undermines the 
purpose of the statute, especially in light of the unbundling of the appellants’ two 
albums and the defendants’ infringement of the individual songs.96 Section 504(c) of 
the Copyright Act allows for one award of statutory damages for each “work” 
infringed and states, “[f]or the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a 
compilation or derivate work constitute one work.”97 In Bryant, the Second Circuit 
supports its finding that an album falls under the Copyright Act’s definition of 
“compilation” by looking to the Act’s legislative history.
 The House Report that accompanied the Copyright Act states that “a 
‘compilation’ results from a process of selecting, bringing together, organizing, and 
arranging previously existing material of all kinds, regardless of whether the 
individual items in the material have been or ever could have been subject to 
copyright.”98 The House Report also states that “[s]ubsection [504] (c)(1) [of the 
Copyright Act] makes clear . . . that, although they are regarded as independent 
works for other purposes, ‘all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute 
one work’ for this purpose.”99 The Second Circuit then concluded: “Based on a plain 
reading of the statute . . . infringement of an album should result in only one statutory 
damage award. The fact that each song may have received a separate copyright is 
irrelevant to this analysis.”100
 The court’s reasoning in Bryant makes clear that, under the text of the Copyright 
Act and its legislative history, when a compilation, in this case an album, is infringed 
in its entirety, the infringer will be liable for one award of statutory damages. 
Appellants even conceded this point in their petition for certiorari to the U.S. 
94. Id. at 285.
95. See supra note 52–53 and accompanying text. 
96. See Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 140–42 (2d Cir. 2010)
97. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).
98. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
99. Id. at 162.
100. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141.
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Supreme Court.101 In Bryant, however, Songs for Dogs and Songs for Cats were not 
only sold as albums by the defendants and therefore infringed in their entirety, but 
also unbundled and transformed into twenty separate works, with the individual 
songs sold by the defendants.102 For this reason, the actions of Media Right and 
Orchard should not be limited to only two awards of statutory damages. The Bryant 
court’s holding creates a rule that all music albums are automatically “compilations” 
under the Copyright Act and, therefore, albums will only be entitled to one award of 
statutory damages if infringed.103 Furthermore, while the Copyright Act includes 
“collective works” in the definition of “compilation,” examples of what constitutes a 
“collective work” includes “a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia.”104 There is 
no mention of an album. Nowhere in the Copyright Act or in its legislative history 
does it specifically mandate that statutory damages be calculated on a per-album 
basis when the “compilation” is split into its constituent parts and infringed piece by 
piece. In fact, such a mandate would go directly against the deterrent purpose of the 
Copyright Act. As stated in their petition to the Supreme Court, appellants conceded 
that their albums could fit into the statutory definition of “compilation.”105 The 
appellants’ primary contention, however, is that Media Right and Orchard should be 
liable for damages on a per-song basis because Media Right and Orchard, without 
authorization, split appellants’ albums into their individual copyrighted parts.106
 In Bryant, prior to the infringement by Media Right and Orchard, Songs for Dogs 
and Songs for Cats were never available in any electronic or digital form.107 The 
appellants in Bryant sold each album in physical copy only, as part of a fully illustrated 
gift set.108 Even so, appellants’ choice to distribute their songs in a specific manner, 
in album form, does not change the fact that each of their songs was capable of 
101. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 656 (2010) 
(No. 10-415), 2010 WL 3740540.
102. See Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2010).
103. As recently as April 2011, courts have been confronted with the stringent rule set forth in Bryant and 
have stipulated ways to work around it. See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 36536 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2011). In Arista, the court held that plaintiffs were entitled to statutory 
damages for each individual song infringed, even though they were also included as part of an album, if 
the songs were also released seperately. The court stated, “[n]othing in the Copyright Act bars a plaintiff 
from recovering a statutory damage award for a sound recording issued as an individual track, simply 
because that plaintiff, at some point in time, also included that sound recording as part of an album or 
other compilation.” Id. at *13. The Arista court’s holding not only suggests a way, though it may be 
cumbersome, to ensure that copyright holders of music qualify for statutory damages under the Copyright 
Act (if you release a song on an album, make sure to also release it as a single), but also recognizes that 
individual songs are capable of standing on their own as individual “works.” See id. at *15.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
105. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 656 (2010) (No. 
10-415), 2010 WL 3740540.
106. See id. at 11.
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standing alone as an individual copyrighted work. Media Right’s and Orchard’s 
ability to sell the songs individually, for a profit, only highlights this point. It is this 
fact that made Bryant the appropriate case for the Second Circuit to apply the 
independent economic value test to music.
 By focusing on how appellants chose to distribute their songs, rather than on 
how the infringement occurred, the court in Bryant, in effect, is stating that any 
copyright owner’s choice to release a work in album form automatically precludes 
statutory damages calculated song-by-song even when individual songs from the 
album are infringed. Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s argument that the text of 
the Copyright Act does not allow for statutory damages to be calculated on a per-
song basis suggests that in order for owners of copyrighted music to take advantage 
of the remedies offered in section 504(c) of the Copyright Act and fully protect their 
creations, individual songs must be distributed as singles before they are compiled 
and distributed in an album.
 Finally, the court’s decision in Bryant diverged from a trend of cases in the D.C., 
First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits employing the independent economic value test. 
Bryant provided an opportunity for the Second Circuit to adopt the independent 
economic value test and apply it to music. Had they done so, the Second Circuit would 
have created a rule that better accounts for the modern changes in media technology 
and the realities of the music industry, which emphasizes individual songs over albums. 
The independent economic value test provides “that a work that is part of a multi-part 
product can constitute a separate work for the purposes of statutory damages if it has 
‘independent economic value and . . . is viable.’”109 Thus, under the independent 
economic value test, a separately registered work that is part of a multi-part work can 
be subject to separate statutory damages if it has its own economic value and can stand 
on its own. As appellants argue, the independent economic value test is appropriately 
applied to music given the increasing availability of downloadable music online, making 
it easier for infringers to unbundle albums and distribute and sell music on a song-by-
song basis, regardless of the intent of the artist to distribute its work in album form.
 The independent economic value test was first set forth in 1990 by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Walt Disney Co. v. Powell.110 Acknowledging that 
the Copyright Act does not define “work,” the D.C. Circuit looked to other courts and 
legal scholars to determine what constitutes a “work” for the purposes of calculating 
statutory damages.111 The court stated that “separate copyrights are not distinct works 
unless they can ‘live their own copyright life,’”112 and “where separate copyrights ‘have 
no separate economic value, whatever their artistic value, they must be considered part 
109. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116–17 (1st Cir. 1993)).
110. 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant’s t-shirts, portraying both Mickey Mouse 
and Minnie Mouse, infringed two of Disney’s “works” because both Mickey and Minnie have 
“independent economic value”).
111. Id. at 569.
112. Id. (quoting Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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of [a] . . . work for purposes of the copyright statute.’”113 Finally, the D.C. Circuit 
turned to a leading commentator on copyright law, Professor Nimmer, who stated that, 
“in order to qualify for a separate minimum award, the work which is the subject of a 
separate copyright would have to be in itself . . . viable.”114 In Disney, the defendant, 
Carl Powell, infringed Disney’s copyright of Mickey and Minnie Mouse by selling six 
t-shirts, each portraying mouse faces resembling the two famous mice.115 The lower 
court found Powell guilty of infringement and awarded six statutory damages to 
Disney, one for each t-shirt design sold.116 While the D.C. Circuit agreed that Powell 
had committed copyright infringement, it reduced the number of statutory damages 
awarded from six to two. The court explained:
While Mickey and Minnie are certainly distinct, viable works with separate 
economic value and copyright lives of their own, we cannot say the same is 
true for all six of the Disney copyrights of Mickey and Minnie in various 
poses which the district court found to be infringed in this case. Mickey is 
still Mickey whether he is smiling or frowning, running or walking, waving 
his left hand or his right. Thus, we find that Powell’s mouse-face shirts 
infringed only two of Disney’s works.117
Therefore, under the independent economic value test, a separately registered work 
can be subject to separate statutory damages if it has its own economic value and is a 
distinct, viable work that can stand on its own.
 In 1993, the First Circuit applied the independent economic value test set forth 
in Disney in Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea.118 There, the circuit court held 
that each episode of a Chinese soap opera, Jade Fox, constituted one “work” when 
computing statutory damages under the Copyright Act.119 In Gamma, plaintiffs had 
the exclusive right to distribute a Cambodian version of the Jade Fox series to video 
rental stores.120 Defendant created copies of the episodes and supplied them to 
customers at their rental stores in Lowell, Massachusetts, without authorization from 
Gamma Audio. Since only some of the Jade Fox episodes were registered separately 
with the U.S. Copyright Office, only episodes thirteen through sixteen were at issue 
in the suit.121 The district court found that the four episodes were considered one 
“work” within the meaning of the Copyright Act because the episodes were from the 
113. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984)).
114. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 52, at 14–40.1.3) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
115. See id. at 567.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 570.
118. 11 F.3d 1106 (1st Cir. 1993).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1109.
121. Id. at 1110.
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same series. Thus, the district court granted Gamma only one award of statutory 
damages.122 On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and 
awarded Gamma four awards of statutory damages—one for each episode infringed.
 The First Circuit started its analysis in Gamma by stating that “our case strongly 
resembles Twin Peaks.” However, because the Second Circuit in Twin Peaks “did not 
undertake the task of supplying a definition” of what constitutes a “work,” the First 
Circuit expanded its analysis by looking to Disney.123 The First Circuit stated that 
“the test set forth in [Disney] is a functional one, with the focus on whether each 
expression . . . has an independent economic value.”124 The circuit court in Gamma 
focused on two facts in determining that the individual episodes of Jade Fox, and not 
the entire series, constituted one “work” for the purposes of statutory damages. First, 
the circuit court stated that “viewers who rent the tapes from their local video stores 
may rent as few or as many tapes as they want, may view one, two or twenty episodes 
in a single sitting, and may never watch or rent all of the episodes.”125 Second, the 
circuit court noted that each episode in the Jade Fox series was separately produced.126 
Furthermore, and in direct opposition to the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Bryant, 
the First Circuit stated that the “distributor’s decision to sell or rent complete sets of a 
series to video stores in no way indicates that each episode in the series is unable to 
stand alone.”127
 In 1996 and 1997 the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, respectively, adopted the 
independent economic value test, holding that each episode of a syndicated television 
series, rather than the series itself, was a separate “work” for purposes of awarding 
statutory damages under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act. In Columbia Pictures 
Television v. Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc.128 and MCA Television Ltd. v. 
Feltner,129 C. Elvin Feltner, a defendant in both cases, owned a number of television 
stations licensed to broadcast certain syndicated television programs. Due to Feltner’s 
failure to pay royalties for the programming, the plaintiffs, in both cases, terminated 
the licensing agreements with Feltner. Feltner’s television stations, however, continued 
to broadcast the television programs, and Feltner was found liable for copyright 
infringement of each episode that was broadcast.130
122. Id. at 1116.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1116–17 (citing Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 564, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1117 (emphasis added).
128. 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997). The infringed television programs included series such as Who’s the Boss?, 
Silver Spoons, Hart to Hart, and T.J. Hooker. Id. at 288.
129. 89 F.3d 766 (11th Cir. 1996). The infringed television programs included series such as Kojak and The A 
Team. Id. at 768.
130. See Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 288; MCA Television, 89 F.3d at 768.
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 In MCA Television, Feltner argued that statutory damages should be calculated 
per television series, instead of per episode, because it was industry practice to license 
programming on a series basis and, therefore, the individual episodes did not have 
independent economic value.131 Following the First Circuit’s decision in Gamma, the 
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Feltner, stating that a copyright owner’s “decision . . . 
to sell television series as a block, rather than as individual shows, in no way indicates 
that each episode in a series is unable to stand alone.”132 Similarly, in Columbia 
Pictures, the Ninth Circuit also held that statutory damages should be calculated per 
episode because “as in [Gamma], viewers may watch as few or as many episodes as 
they want . . . . [T]he episodes could be repeated and broadcast in different orders. . . . 
[and] the episodes were separately written, produced, and registered,”133 thus each 
episode had independent economic value.
 In addition, the court in Bryant failed to recognize that as recently as 2008 at 
least one of its district courts had employed the independent economic value test. 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the 
independent economic value test in U2 Home Entertainment, Inc. v. Hong Wei 
International Trading, Inc.134 In U2 Home, plaintiffs had the exclusive right to 
distribute Chinese-language films and television programs on videotape, DVDs, and 
video cassette discs (VCD).135 Defendants infringed plaintiff ’s copyrights in the 
episodes by unlawfully duplicating and distributing the programs to customers on 
VCD through its video store located in Manhattan.136 Plaintiffs alleged that 
defendants infringed seventy different television series for a total of 1236 individual 
episodes.137 Relying on the decision in Gamma, the district court found that damages 
should be calculated on a per-episode basis because each episode had independent 
economic value and, therefore, each qualified as one “work” under section 504(c) of 
the Copyright Act.138
 Having found that the television episodes had independent economic value, the 
district court in U2 Home then considered how many of the episodes were separately 
registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.139 The court found that fifty-two of the 
television titles, instead of the alleged seventy, were under copyright registration. 
Therefore, only 894 individual episodes, instead of 1236, were eligible for statutory 
damages.140 This reduced the amount of statutory damages from $927,000 to 
131. MCA Television, 89 F.3d at 769.
132. Id.
133. Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 295.
134. No. 04 Civ. 6189(JFK), 2008 WL 3906889 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008).
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *4.
138. Id. at *13–14. 
139. Id. at *14.
140. Id. at *16.
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$670,500, with the court awarding plaintiffs the minimum award for statutory 
damages, $750, per episode infringed.
 The independent economic value test is appropriately applied to music in 
consideration of the wide availability of digital music.141 Like the copyrighted 
products discussed in the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions, the 
individual songs in Bryant can stand alone as separately copyrighted works with 
independent economic value. Media Right and Orchard clearly demonstrated that 
each of appellants’ songs had independent economic value by selling the songs as 
individual works through online retailers. By making the songs available as individual 
works, Media Right and Orchard completely changed appellants’ original product by 
unbundling the two albums and allowing consumers to access the individual songs 
in a completely new way. Like the viewers of the Jade Fox series in Gamma, purchasers 
of individual songs from Songs for Dogs or Songs for Cats from online vendors such as 
iTunes were able to purchase one, three, or five individual songs without ever having 
to purchase, or listen to, either album in its entirety. And similar to the television 
shows at issue in Columbia Pictures, purchasers of appellants’ songs could have 
listened to them in any order they chose, regardless of the order appellants had 
predetermined on the albums. Furthermore, appellants wrote, composed, arranged, 
performed, recorded, and produced all twenty individual songs, and most of the 
songs were separately registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.142 Consistent with 
Gamma, and as upheld in Columbia Pictures and MCA Television, appellants’ decision 
to distribute the songs from Songs for Dogs and Songs for Cats in album form “in no 
way indicates that [the individual songs on the albums are] unable to stand alone.”143
 The Second Circuit in Bryant suggested that appellants’ request to have statutory 
damages calculated on a per-song basis was unreasonable and would result in an 
egregious award in comparison to Media Right’s and Orchard’s profits.144 The circuit 
court stated,
[t]he District Court awarded a total of $2,400 in statutory damages, based on 
its finding that Appellees’ profits from infringing sales of the [a]lbums and 
songs were meager, and that the award did not need to be higher to achieve 
deterrence, because deterrence was effectuated here by Appellees’ having to 
pay their own attorneys fees.145
 Requiring infringers to pay their own attorneys’ fees, however, does not change 
the fact that the circuit court’s ruling in Bryant, in effect, holds an infringer of one 
141. See Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2010).
142. See Bryant v. Europadisk, No. 07 Civ. 3050(WGY), 2009 WL 1059777, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2009).
143. Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993).
144. Appellees also were reasonable in trying to resolve the case short of trial: Appellees 
made an Offer of Judgment in the amount of $3000, which Appellants rejected, in 
favor of continuing to demand over $1 million in damages, notwithstanding the 
evidence that Appellees had received less than $600 in revenues from infringing sales.
 Bryant, 603 F.3d at 144.
145. Id. (footnote omitted).
1256
BRYANT V. MEDIA RIGHT PRODUCTIONS, INC.
song on an album as liable as an infringer of ten songs on an album. The Second 
Circuit’s decision inherently encourages the infringement of multiple songs on an 
album, as opposed to one song, because the penalty is the same. As one commentator 
has stated, “[w]hen a prospective infringer realizes that the damages he or she would 
be liable for are limited to one . . . statutory award, he or she may be more willing to 
take the risk of getting caught for infringing the work.”146 Furthermore, calculating 
damages on a per-song basis would not have created an unreasonable result. If the 
court in Bryant had found that all twenty of appellants’ songs had independent 
economic value, the total amount of damages awarded appellants would have been 
$24,000, based on the court’s original calculations that Orchard was liable for $200 
per infringed work and Media Right was liable for $1,000 for each infringed work.
 However, this figure is based on the Second Circuit’s assumption that all twenty 
of appellants’ songs were, indeed, registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.147 Had 
the court diligently considered this issue, as the district court did in U2 Home, it 
would have found the actual number of registered songs to be less.148 It would have 
been well within the discretion of the Second Circuit to hold Media Right liable for 
$750 per infringed work instead of $1,000. In a per-song calculation of damages, this 
would lower the award from $24,000 to $19,000.149 While this figure is substantially 
larger than the $2,400 award granted to appellants in Bryant, a larger award would 
certainly serve as a stronger deterrent against the future infringement of music.
 Under the independent economic value test, the songs in Bryant would qualify as 
separate “works.” While the circuit courts that have adopted the independent 
economic value test have mainly applied it to television series, especially syndicated 
television, it appropriately applies to music albums. The music industry, like the 
television industry, continues to evolve and offer consumers multiple ways to access 
music products. The popularity of the MP3 player and the wide availability of digital 
music on iTunes illustrate music consumers’ desire to purchase music on a song-by-
song basis and to opt for the personalized playlist in lieu of the album. The 
disaggregation of the music album, however, also increases the likelihood of 
infringement on a song-by-song basis. The song, like the album, is a copyrightable 
“work” that deserves equal protection from infringers, regardless of whether it was 
originally released as part of an album or as a single. By refusing to adopt the 
independent economic value test, the Second Circuit’s decision in Bryant fails to 
further the dual goals of the Copyright Act: promoting the progress of future creators 
and deterring prospective infringers. Had the Second Circuit relied on the guidance 
of the D.C., First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits by adopting the independent 
economic value test in recognition of the modern trends of the digital music industry, 
the court would have reached a decision that deters the future infringement of music.
146. Zawada, supra note 11, at 150.
147. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
149. This figure is still based on the assumption that all twenty of appellants’ songs were indeed registered 
with the U.S. Copyright Office.
